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ABSTRACT
The IPv4 address space is small enough to allow exhaus-
tive active measurement, permitting important insight into
Internet growth, policy, and evolution. The IPv6 address
space, on the other hand, presents the problem that we can no
longer perform exhaustive measurements in the same way,
inhibiting our ability to continue studying Internet growth.
Access to private datasets (e.g., HTTP access logs on con-
tent servers, flow data in ISP networks, or passive DNS traces)
solves some problems but may not be feasible or desirable.
This paper describes IPv6 address collection by exhaustively
sweeping the reverse DNS domain for the IPv4 address space
and performing AAAA queries on the results. Subsequent
ICMP and TCP measurements are conducted to measure the
responsiveness of the resulting set. Key outcomes include:
the PTR sweep discovers 965,304 unique, globally routable
IPv6 addresses originating from 5,531 ASNs. 56% of the
addresses are responsive, across 4,571 ASNs. Upon infer-
ring pairs of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that are likely associ-
ated with the same device, the data indicates a trend toward
IPv4 addresses being more responsive than their IPv6 coun-
terparts, with a higher incidence rate of TCP connections be-
ing refused, and wide disparity on where TCP connections
or ICMP echo requests fail silently when comparing IPv4
and IPv6. The disparity in IPv4 and IPv6 responsiveness is
highly variable, and indicative of distinct host configuration
and network policies across the two networks, presenting po-
tential policy or security gaps as the IPv6 network matures.
1. INTRODUCTION
Exhaustive active measurement of the Internet’s IPv6
address space is infeasible: the current global allocation
defines up to 2125 addressable hosts and 261 addressable
networks [2]. Individual IPv6 BGP advertisements are
intractably large for exhaustive scans: BGP tables from
February 29th 2016, 43.5% of advertisements were /48s
(i.e., 216 individual /64s); 25.3% were /32s. The pace
of growth in the IPv6 network necessitates additional
sources of addresses for direct measurement, or to aug-
ment existing heuristics used to constrain the search
space for active measurement.
The problem for active measurement in an IPv6 Inter-
net, therefore, is how to derive subsets of the IP space to
use in measurement studies. There is no direct address
mapping mechanism to determine the IPv6 address of
a known-reachable IPv4 address. Traffic data is often
used to understand the IPv6 address space: HTTP ac-
cess logs at content servers, passive DNS traces, or net-
work flow data, all of which can reveal subsets of the
active address space. However, gaining access to these
datasets may not be feasible or desirable, and often the
data cannot be released publicly. Public sources will
be used to locate IPv6 hosts for measurement or more
nefarious purposes; it is important that the nature of
publicly discoverable devices be understood.
This paper describes a study in which reverse DNS
queries are made against all publicly routable IPv4 ad-
dresses advertised on February 29th 2016. The resulting
names are then used to perform forward AAAA queries
in order to derive a large set of around 1 million unique
IPv6 addresses. This technique relies on the assumption
that there is often physical and naming overlap with
IPv4 for reasons of minimising costs and simplifying
network management; it is likely to commonly produce
IP addresses assigned to infrastructure in addition to
end-hosts and servers. The types of addresses returned,
and the results of active ICMP and TCP measurements,
are presented. Finally, a conservative pairing of IPv4
and IPv6 addresses is constructed; key to this part of
the study is whether there is disparity, indicating im-
mature network policy, or differing host configuration.
The contributions of this work include an evaluation
of using the IPv4 space and DNS to discover IPv6 ad-
dresses for active measurement, an analysis of the live-
ness of those addresses using ICMP and TCP metrics,
and an attempt at pairwise comparison of IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses likely assigned to the same device to
determine whether there are gaps in network or host
configuration or policies.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 covers
background and related work. Sections 3 through 5
cover the collection of PTR records, the collection of
AAAA records, then active measurement against those
addresses respectively. Section 6 summarises the paper.
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2. BACKGROUND
Other work has studied aspects of IPv6 deployment
and maturity. Czyz et al. studied various metrics IPv6
deployment metrics [8], including nameservers with IPv6
connectivity, IPv6 glue records, queries arriving at name-
servers, and others including active measurement on the
top 10,000 domains listed in the Alexa top-million pop-
ularity index. The study shows that IPv6 is maturing
by all metrics, though not all at the same pace.
Plonka and Berger contributed traffic measurements
from Akamai’s content delivery network, and charac-
terised the temporal stability of the IPv6 space in [8].
Their study features IPv6 addresses collected from HTTP
access logs, and shows how hosts or ISPs use that space.
On network maturity, Livadaria et al. [16] compare
aspects of IPv4 and IPv6 network stability, including
routing stability and the effect on data-plane stability.
Their findings suggest that the IPv6 network is propor-
tionally less stable than the IPv4 network. Beverly et
al. also recently studied router availability, albeit with-
out a contrast to IPv4 stability [6]; much earlier work
attempted to perform global topology discovery [20, 15]
Understanding the structure of the IPv6 Internet,
and the means by which anybody may be able to con-
duct network measurement or by which attacks may be
staged, is important; for example, how the IPv6 net-
work structure may be used to launch malicious traf-
fic [5]. Other work has listed speculative approaches or
concerns around to active IPv6 measurement [12].
Some work has attempted to use the ip6.arpa DNS
domain to locate public IPv6 addresses [10], though the
approach may not return many responses [14]. Nikkhah
et al. also used the Alexa top-million index to feed DNS
queries to locate A and AAAA records to perform active
measurements on connectivity and throughput [19].
Earlier work suggested that stateless addressing (SLAAC)
or addressing that placed a device’s IPv4 address into
the bottom 32-bits of its IPv6 were commonplace [17].
Since then, privacy extensions for autonomous host ad-
dressing were specified [18] and have become common
primarily in end-hosts. RFC 7721 [7] provides an overview
of privacy, and address generation mechanisms.
3. SWEEPING IN-ADDR.ARPA
The first step of this work is to collect DNS names
from which AAAA records can be queried. The start-
ing point is understanding that, first, the IPv4 space is
currently under high utilisation and, second, that per-
forming queries to retrieve PTR records for all IPv4
addresses is feasible and cheap. The in-addr.arpa do-
main is used as a means to perform a query against an
IPv4 address, returning one or more names for a host if
the owner of the address space has provided one.
The principle caveat is to note that there is no opera-
tional requirement for network administrators to config-
ure PTR records for their address space. While cover-
age will not be complete, the practice is currently com-
mon enough to provide a large set of names. In many
cases, a successful query for a PTR record is likely to
return a name that refers to a single network device.
3.1 Approach
To conduct all the DNS queries presented in this
section and the active measurements presented in Sec-
tion 5, four virtual hosts hosted by DigitalOcean were
deployed in the UK. Each VM runs a local instance of
bind, reachable only by processes on the localhost.
Each host ran a program dedicated to performing
the DNS queries presented in this study (A, AAAA,
and PTR), issuing and handling multiple DNS queries
asynchronously with the assistance of libevent.
For each IPv4 address derived from a full routing ta-
ble collected by Route Views on February 29th 2016 [3],
a PTR query was sent and the responses, including er-
ror codes, stored for inspection. This table includes
2,814,910,336 global IPv4 addresses, each of which is
used to create a reverse DNS query for this study. The
AAAA responses are covered in Section 4.
DNS PTR queries took place between March 8th and
March 17th 2016. DNSSEC was not used during this
initial study, but should be enabled for future work. In
cases where the DNS response is too long for a UDP
datagram, queries are reissued over TCP.
3.2 PTR Responses Obtained
A summary of responses is outlined in Table 1(a).
1.19 billion queries returned names (around 42.8%). 1.4
billion return an NXDOMAIN error, with no configured
subdomain for the address space. Around 200 million
returned a server failure code, and another 3 million
where the domain is configured but no record is found.
A small number of queries failed with timeouts. From
the set of 1.4 billion queries that returned an answer,
a short breakdown of obvious misconfigurations of bad
data is presented in Table 1(b).
24,945 names returned multiple PTR records. A par-
tial distribution of the larger answer sets is shown in
Figure 1, indicating that after the common convention
of one record per name, the most common PTR sets,
though rare, are 15-20 records in size. The largest set
observed from a PTR query was 1,248 records associ-
ated to one IPv4 address. Breaking out the records
that returned multiple responses, we have a full set of
1,190,767,539 names.
The names revealed through this process often iden-
tify infrastructure nodes (routers, middleboxes, firewalls,
etc) in addition to hosts intended for use as public
servers. Common strings surface: “static”, “customer”,
“gw”; numeric strings and two or three-character codes.
The set of names is therefore distinct from datasets
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Figure 1: Partial range of PTR response sets larger
than one record; full range includes sets with over 1,000
records.
Type Count
No domain 1,421,766,914
Serv failure 199,697,905
No data 3,055,458
Other 32,112
No Error 1,190,362,811
Total 2,814,915,200
(a) Response types
String Count
localhost 2,401,398
empty string 965,114
IPv4 addr 184,858
127.0.0.1 1,517
0.0.0.0 10
(b) Notable results
Table 1: PTR query response overview.
based on common web accesses or DNS requests. In
addition, many of the names resolve directly to one
network device, rather than a name that points into
a geo-based DNS load balancer.
“localhost” is associated with 2.4M addresses, and
various other strings that appear to be configuration
error are returned; the empty string is associated with
almost 1 million IPv4 addresses, and often the PTR
record is a string of the IPv4 address used to create the
query. These are summarised in the right-hand column
of Table 1.
4. IPV6 ADDRESS SWEEP
The names discovered in the previous section form
the basis for the next stage, querying for AAAA records.
4.1 Approach
Using the same infrastructure as the name collec-
tion stage, a AAAA query was issued for each of the
1,190,767,539 names, and the responses were collected.
These queries were conducted between March 24th and
March 28th. Results from the previous section were not
de-duplicated, but bind was configured to cache results
to minimise the number of duplicate queries emitted.
4.2 Results
An overview of the responses in this stage is shown
in Table 2(a); 4,742,818 queries (0.4%) returned AAAA
records, with particular responses shown in Table 2(b):
for example, 2.4 million responses were the result of
querying the “localhost” string from the PTR sweep,
and a further million came from a common string
Type Count
No data 856,923,311
No domain 315,419,165
Server failure 13,678,831
Timeout 3,414
No error 4,742,818
Total 1,190,767,539
(a) Response types
Type Count
::1 2,401,386
level3 1,024,600
prefix:: 7,715
:: 84
(b) Notable results
Table 2: Overview of results to the AAAA queries.
Network Name ASN #
SURFnet (NL) 1103 93,649
Deutsche Tele. (DE) 3320 79,903
1&1 (DE) 8560 51,326
Comcast (US) 7922 43,384
GMO (JP) 7506 40,672
Yandex (RU) 13238 35,109
Host Europe (DE) 20773 23,522
Hetzner Online (DE) 24940 19,404
Contabo (DE) 51167 15,516
CloudFlare (US) 13335 14,387
(a) ISPs
Country Count
DE 237,896
US 222,528
EU 123,423
RU 43,679
GB 40,082
FR 33,733
NL 28,547
CZ 15,949
NO 11,355
SG 11,198
(b) Country Codes
Table 3: Networks and countries with the greatest num-
ber of unique IPv6 addresses discovered.
“unknown.level3.net”, which all resolved to
2001:1900:2300:2f00::ff at the time of the study.
This leaves 1,316,832 AAAA responses. After removal
of duplicates and non-routable addresses with no corre-
sponding ASN in the BGP table, 965,304 unique, glob-
ally routable IPv6 addresses remain. These occupy
328,134 /64s, and originate from 5,531 ASNs.
The number of addresses matching each origin ASN
is heavily skewed: 3,132 are small, returning fewer than
10 IP addresses; 717 IPv6 addresses are the only address
from that ASN; 626 ASNs have two IPv6 addresses; 412
have three. 1,826 return 10 or more, but fewer than 100
IPv6 addresses, and 573 ASNs return more than 100 IP
addresses. The largest of these have tens of thousands
of IP addresses in the DNS.
Table 3(a) enumerates the top 10 ASNs from the
data, given unique occurrences of IP addresses. The
geographic diversity of the networks is evident; notable
is the variety of providers listed: domestic ISPs are
present, but so too are virtual hosting companies, re-
search networks, and content delivery networks. The
range of networks is of particular importance: passive
address collection from content networks has a tendency
to skew towards collecting address sets from domestic
ISPs, and not a wider variety of networks. Table 3(b) in-
dicates the country-level distribution, according to the
country code for the ASN registered by the regional in-
ternet registries.
Table 4 describes sets of IPv6 addresses discovered
that match the blocks defined in the IANA special-
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Class Count Class Count
6to4 109,078 :: 84
v4-mapped Addr 5,080 Teredo 72
::1, not “localhost” 4,350 Documentation 18
Link-local 981 IETF 5
IPv4-v6 Translat. 555 Direct, AS112 3
Unique-Local 553
Table 4: Overview of special-purpose addresses.
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Figure 2: Bit patterns in the addresses returned.
purpose IPv6 registry. 103,928 queries of those returned
one or more of the same class of special-purpose ad-
dress, outlined in Table 4.
Figure 2 indicates structure in the lower 64 bits, the
Interface ID (IID) portion, of the addresses. The IID
can be generated by various mechanisms; for fixed in-
frastructure, these are often statically assigned and likely
to follow well-defined patterns. Using the addresses ob-
tained, these plots show how frequently each bit is the
first bit set in the IID portion; that is, they are a mea-
sure of the string of zeros before any set bits. Note
that the least significant bit of the address space is on
the left-hand side of the plots. In these addresses, Fig-
ure 2(a) indicates clearly that the 127th and 128th bits
are commonly the only bits set in the addresses discov-
ered in this study, but there are other bumps near some
byte boundaries. Figure 2(b) shows the same data in
cumulative form. We can see that for 50% of these ad-
dresses, the first bit set is the 104th bit or later, and
for two thirds of the addresses, the first bit is the 96th
bit or higher. Such indicators are useful in constraining
the speculative measurement space.
Other notable address counts are as follows:
All-zeros: 7,715 returned addresses have an IID set to
zero; in 84 returned addresses, all bits are zero.
Stable IIDs: 73,532 addresses were returned with bits
7 and 25 – 39 (“ff:fe”) set in the IID, indicating
a SLAAC address generated from a MAC address.
72,888, are globally routable, associated with hosts
from 1,007 different ASNs. RFC 7043 [4] states
that these static addresses should not be published
in the DNS because of the the privacy concern they
present.
Special-Purpose Addresses: Table 4 lists the num-
ber of names that resolve to special-purpose IPv6
address ranges [1]. In all, 120,780 queries returned
a special-purpose address. Some 304 names re-
turned both globally routable addresses and special-
purpose addresses.
Non-standard Addresses : 28,889 unique responses
fall outside the standard IANA allocations. Many
of those are the origin IPv4 address in the bottom
32-bits without the network portion set, much like
the deprecated IPv4-Compatible IPv6 Addresses [13].
Many others are 32-bit values padded into the most
signifcant bits of the returned address, which do
not appear to match the origin IPv4 address.
::1: The origins of the localhost strings in Table 2 is
largely constrained to a small set of ASNs, primar-
ily registered in Vietnam; the largest contributors
are ASNs 45899, 7552, and 7643.
4.3 Pairing IPv4 and IPv6 Addresses
Next, we attempt to consider IPv4 and IPv6 ad-
dresses in pairs. Attempting to pair addresses across
protocol families offers scope for direct like-for-like mea-
surement of performance or network policy, against in-
frastructure which is not as heavily monitored as, say,
content servers. It may be possible to determine the
gaps in host configuration and security policies between
the IPv4 and the IPv6 networks.
To pair IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, the following ap-
proach was used: in each of the cases where an AAAA
query returned at least one result which was a glob-
ally routable address with an ASN in the routing table
used throughout this paper, an additional A query was
attempted on the same domain name. There are of
course many cases where names may resolve to multi-
ple addresses (for either family); to pair addresses, I
have conservatively retained only IP addresses follow-
ing the following criteria: addresses resolve from the
same name, originate from the same ASN, and where
no address resolves against any other name with a con-
tradictory result. Note that this could be expanded in
cases where the same organisation uses multiple ASNs.
This process leads to 673,108 pairs of unique IPv4
and IPv6 addresses originating from 5,228 ASNs.
Note there is no requirement that A and PTR records
transpose: querying the PTR record for a given IP ad-
4
dress then the A record of the resulting name need not
return the original IPv4 address. Further, the name
in the PTR record may have A and AAAA records,
but without any requirement that they map onto the
same network device. In the common case, however, it
is likely that there is a strong correlation of A records
and AAAA records mapping onto a single device or in-
terface, not least to reduce management complexity.
4.4 Summary
Although the yield on this form of collection is low,
the range of addresses obtained and the location of
those (by ASN, registered country, and set of ISPs) is
broad. As a data source for forming sets of addresses
for measurement, range is important. Broad coverage
such as this helps us to understand the subnets actu-
ally in use as a subset of what is visible in BGP, and
to better understand static address allocation patterns
within networks. The addresses found here are used in
the following section.
5. ACTIVE MEASURMENT
In this section, we will use a limited set of active
measurements to better understand how active the set
of addresses is. These measurements are intended as
a lightweight first attempt at characterising the ad-
dresses, rather than anything that may be construed
as invasive port scanning or flooding.
While tools exist specifically for either port scanning
(nmap) or rapid measurement of the IPv4 address space
(zmap [11] and masscan), tooling for large-scale scan-
ning is weaker for IPv6. scan6 attempts to specula-
tively search IPv6 networks with various heuristics; in
this work, we have a fixed set of target addresses.
The two broad tests conducted on these addresses
were ICMP echo requests, and TCP connection attempts
to various well-known port numbers. These tests used
the same virtual machines as used for the DNS queries,
employing GNU Parallel with standard tools: ping and
ping6 for the echo requests, and the standard OpenBSD
release of netcat for TCP connections.
The set of unique IPv6 addresses was reordered us-
ing the GNU tool shuf, and the paired IPv4 addresses
identified in Section 4.3 were inserted adjacent to their
IPv6 counterpart. This list was divided across the four
virtual machines, and each individual step scheduled
to take approximately 24 hours. The intention here
is to be deliberately lightweight, taking measurements
against apparent pairs at approximately the same time
but otherwise attempting to stage the work such that
consecutive runs of addresses are avoided.
5.1 Ethical Considerations
The measurements for this study were all conducted
against IP addresses publicly listed in DNS: no brute-
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Figure 3: Histogram showing distribution of ASNs re-
sponding to echo requests.
force or speculative measurement was attempted. The
measurements relied on no unusual TCP or IP options,
didn’t send any data aside from packets required for
echo requests, TCP handshakes, and TCP teardowns.
TCP connections were closed immediately if successful,
and no data from the connection was read or stored.
Nothing other than the outcome of an echo request or
a connection attempt is stored (packets, payload, etc,
are all discarded immediately).
The hosts running the measurements also each ran a
webserver, configured to serve an informational page on
the study with contact details. Five networks requested,
via DigitalOcean, that the measurements cease. In these
cases, all addresses advertised from the ASN identified
in the report from future measurements.
5.2 ICMP Echo Requests
Three ICMP echo requests were sent to each target
address, the address marked active if any responses were
received. Timeouts of 3s were recorded.
544,156 addresses (56.7%) responded to echo requests,
across 4,573 ASNs (82.7% of the ASNs discovered in
Section 4). The range of responses by ASN, as a per-
centage of the set of IP addresses per ASN, is indicated
in Figure 3; the clear bimodal pattern is generated by
ASNs with small sets of hosts either all responding or
not responding at all, while the ASNs with larger ad-
dress sets offer a much more varied response.
5.3 TCP Measurements
TCP connections were attempted to the addresses
discovered in the previous section, on a range of port
numbers: 21, 22, 53, 80, 443, and 8080. The purpose
is not to be exhaustive, merely to investigate common
port numbers to determine if there are gaps in policy
or configuration. The full list of addresses was tested
against one port before progressing to the next. Con-
nections were staged slowly, paced at around 85,000 ad-
dresses an hour. When a TCP connection timed out
(using a 3s timer), no retry was attempted.
Broadly, on port 80, around 21.1% of connections
were made successfully, and 13.3% were refused; on port
22, 18.5% were successful and 9.4% refused. In all cases,
around 60% of requests were silently dropped.
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Figure 4: ICMP and TCP response rates.
Notably, 31,527 addresses accept or reset a TCP con-
nection (on at least one of the ports tested) in cases
where ICMP echo requests were not returned. This
may be intentional, if network administrators have de-
cided to drop ICMP traffic to or from hosts against the
current practice specified in [9].
5.4 Evaluating the IPv4-IPv6 Pairing
Here, we will refer to the pairs of addresses identi-
fied in Section 4.3. Figure 4(a) presents an overview
of the response rates for echo requests and TCP con-
nection attempts on the port numbers tested. First,
note that on this smaller set of addresses, the ICMP
echo response rate is slightly higher than the full set
of addresses available, with 61.7% of the paired IPv6
addresses responding. The response or success rates on
all tests was lower on IPv6 than IPv4, however: 67.8%
of the IPv4 addresses responded to echo requests.
Figure 4(b) attempts to break down the distributions
of the response rates in each ASN according to the type
of the response. In all cases, IPv4 hosts are more likely
to respond to ICMP echo requests, and are more likely
to accept connections on the ports tested, while the
IPv6 devices are more likely to reject connections, im-
plying services are configured to listen on IPv4 but not
yet on IPv6. TCP drop ratios are, on average, equiv-
alent for IPv4 and IPv6 traffic, though the spread in
individual networks is wide. These trends are not uni-
versal, and there is wide disparity in responses across
networks. The data presented here suggests there are
gaps in host or network policy between IPv4 and IPv6;
in some cases this may be intentional, for example if
server software isn’t deemed stable with IPv6 traffic.
6. CONCLUSIONS/IMPLICATIONS
This paper has presented an approach for discovering
IPv6 addresses that can be used for public measure-
ment. By sweeping PTR records of the IPv4 address
space as advertised in BGP then performing AAAA
queries against the returned names, 965,304 unique IPv6
addresses are located in 5,531 autonomous systems. 56.7%
of those respond to ICMP echo requests from 82.7% of
those autonomous systems.
On attempting to pair IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, 673,108
pairs of unique IPv4 and IPv6 addresses originating
from 5,228 are discovered in ASNs. 61.7% of the IPv6
addresses respond to echo requests compared to 67.8%
of the IPv4 addresses. Performing TCP measurements
against these addresses exposes a similar trend: devices
are more likely to respond over IPv4 than over IPv6.
The causes of this are unclear, but a slightly higher
proportion of IPv6 hosts refusing connections implies
host configuration for services lagging network policies.
While this approach relies on the IPv4 space to lo-
cate IPv6 addresses on which measurements can be at-
tempted, the IPv4 network is a resource that we should
not ignore while it is still dominant. Obviously, ap-
proaches must change in future when IPv6 becomes the
dominant protocol family.
This study highlights some configuration, privacy, or
security concerns. For example, SLAAC addresses in
the DNS may be intentional or accidental. Similarly,
dropped ICMP traffic may be intentional, or indicative
of immature network security policies.
Finally, this study has shown some structure evident
in the IPv6 addresses collected. Bit patterns from real
IPv6 deployments, especially for fixed infrastructure, is
useful to help improve existing heuristics for specula-
tive active measurement studies. Such heuristics are by
definition not exhaustive, but may allow active mea-
surement studies of the IPv6 space similar to the large
body of existing IPv4 active measurement work.
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